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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LE ROY SHELBY and ADAN 
THORNOCK, 
Re:)pondents a·nd Plai·nt·iffs, 
vs. 
NICK CHOeRNOS, 
Defendant and AppBllant. 
STATE~fENT OF CASE 
For convenience of the Court and counsel, the par-
ties hereto will be ref erred to as they were in the lower 
court, wherein appellant was the defendant and re-
spondents- were plaintiffs. 
The defendant, in the opening paragraph of his 
brief states the question involved in this appeal as being, 
''What rights, if any, has the owner of grazing 
lands to protect the same against wilful and cort-
tinuous trespassing of livestock~'' 
The answer to the question propounded is that an 
owner of grazing land has three remedies against tres-
passing livestock, as follows : 
1. A suit for injunction against the owner of the 
trespassing livestock to restrain the continued trespass. 
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~. An action for damages caused. by the trespass. 
3. The rig-ht to remove the trespassing animals from 
his land. 
This appeal involves only the third remedy, namely, 
the rig-ht of the o\vner to remove the trespassing ani-
mals, as the action---below- did not involv-e either of the 
first two -remedies. According-ly, the only issue - in-
volved in this appeal is wh-ether the defendant acted 
w·ithin the limitations prescribed by law in his removal 
of plaintiff's lives to~ from his property. The lower 
court held that the manner in which defendant removed 
plaintiffs' livestock from his property was unlawful, 
with resulting damages to plaintiffs. Accordingly, the 
only question involved is whether there was evidence 
before the lo\ver court- to support the finding complained 
of. 
' 
STA.'rE~IENT OF FACTS 
. Defendant?s statement of facts in this case does 
not adequately reflect .. the .evidence which was before 
the lower court, and for that reasOll, we deem. it advis-
able to review briefly the evidence . 
. On June 12,. 1946, plaintiffs purchased thirty-six 
head of steers and at that time placed them on plaintiff 
Shelby's property, ( \Vhich .constitutes approxirila tely one 
section ofjaud -located) in Rich County," Utah.· (The de-
~endant o\vned or had control of a vast amount of land, 
or approximately sixteen thousand ac-res, that substan-
tially enclosed the land of the plaintiff.) That, ou the 
29th day of September, 1946, the plaintiff LeRoy 8helby 
had placed his stock oil a portion of his lauds completely 
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bounded by a feuee on the 'vest and north, together 
"~ith almost all of the east side of his property, ( Tr. 52) 
~ · Q .. A.nd your land on the east "\Yas open between 
yourself and ~lr. Chournos ~ '' 
.. 1. X o sir, it's mostly fenced with the exception 
of just a slig·ht bit at the v.ery corner there. 
Q On the 19th of August. 
A Yes sir, that "\Yas the day I got the fence on 
the \vest finished. ' ' 
although the southern portion of plaintiff Shelby's prop-
erty was open. (Tr. 45, Plaintiffs' Exhibit C) 
As late as 10:00 o'clock in the mon1ing on that date, 
all of the cattle were on Shelby's property. (Tr. 56) 
At approximately 3 :00 or 4:00, Shelby and his wife, 
on horseback, \vent up to round up the thirty-six head 
of the steers ( Tr. 54). At that time they were only able 
to find 19 head, but they were located on Shelby's 
property along his west fence. (Tr. 54) Shelby and his 
wife proceeded to drive the cattle across his property 
to the north and out a gate on his nothern boundary and 
down what had been used as a roadway when he· was 
stopped by Marriner Brown (Tr. 19), while the seven-
teen head of cattle proceeded on down the road and 
around a bend in the hill. During the period that plain-
tiff and his wife conversed with 1'1r. Brown, Mr. Chour-
nos appeared, riding on horseback, from a distance 
away, a fact which was admitted by the defendant (Tr. 
82-84). Upon finishing the conversation, plaintiff Shel-
by and his wife proceeded down to the Monte Cristo 
road, which wa.s to the north of them, a.nd were .unable · 
to see their cattle, although they were advised by one 
Longhurst that he had seen ~Ir. Chournos, the defend-
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ant, driving the seventeen head of cattle while on horse-
back and with the aid of a dog. At that time, the cattle 
were on a run. (Tr. 21) 
"Q Now you say he \vas driving cattle. Just what 
what do you mean, sir' 
A Well, he 'vas having a dog bite the cattle. They 
\Vere on the run and a fey{ of the cattle had their 
tongues out and seemed to be pretty well out of 
breath.'' 
Approximately one hour later, these cattle were seen 
returning in the general direction of the Shelby pro-
perty at a distance between four and six miles away 
from the Shelby property. (Tr. 26-28, Tr. 68-70) 
This running occurred between the hours of one-
half hour before sunset (Tr. 19) and one-half hour after 
sunset (Tr. 27). It might be pointed out at this time 
that both plaintiffs' witness and defendant's witness 
stated that one-half hour after sunset, they were re-
turning towards the Shelby property, which would in-
dicate that they must logically have come from a point 
further from the point from the Shelby property than 
that where they we~e seen. 
The evidence as to the nineteen head of cattle which 
plaintiff Shelby did not find on that afternoon of Sep-
tember 29th indicates that he tracked a single footed 
horse, which was the horse that Mr. Chournos admitted 
riding, for a distance of four and one-half to five miles 
east of the Shelby property (Tr. 80), and the evidence 
further indiootes (Tr. 61-63) that they were likewise 
driven on a run. 
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Evidene<.'} 8hO\\·ed that eattle should not be driven 
at a rate to exceed t\YO and one-half miles per hour, 
and that 8hould they be driven all day at that rate, 
that tht\Y mig-ht lose up to four per cent of their gross 
'veigbt. (Tr. 28-44). 
Defenda11t Chouruos maintains that his only pur-
pose in driYing the rattle at all \Yas to remove them from 
his premises, yet he drove the seventeen head of steers 
(Tr. 77- 86) a distance of some three and one-half miles 
a\vay from the premises owned by the plaintiff, although 
he admitted that he knew that there was every likei-
hood that the milk cow would return or attempt to re-
turn to the Shelby property, and that steers are inclined 
to follow a leader and therefore some would follow the 
\ 
milk C0"\"\7 • A few did and in so doing· duplicated in reverse 
the course they had taken over the defendants' property. 
This would seem to be a peculiar method of removing 
cattle from one's premises. 
Defendant stated that his only reason for driving 
the other nineteen head of steers was a similar desire 
to rid his premises of these particular animals, although 
the evidence shows that he drove them between four 
and four and one-half miles east of the Shelby property, 
although his east line was approximately one-half mile 
east of the Shelby property, so that the facts sho\v 
that the defendant drove the cattle some three and one-
half or four miles east and beyond the defendant's east--
ern property line. As a result of defendant's driving of 
these cattle, they became lost to the plaintiff and wer·3 
found in rocky, mountainous country without adequate 
forage or water as long as three \veeks after defendant 
drove them. (rrr. 3-7, Tr. 35-50). When they were 
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found, they bad lost au average \veight of ninety pounds. 
(Tr. 3-7, Tr. 45-50, Tr. 6{}-62). The cattle we-re there-
after delivered to Sage, Wyoming, to market, "There 
they sold at an average price of 16lj2 cents per pound, 
and -crediting this value per pound to the weight lost, 
it was found that the plaintiffs had been damaged in 
the sum of Five Hundred Thirty-Four and 60/100 
( $534.60) Dollar~. 
ARGUl\iENT 
It will be observed that the only objection appellaut 
voices is that the facts do not justify the verdict. 
This case \vas tried to the court without a jury, 
and the rule in such eases is stated in 5 C. J. S., Appeal 
and Error, Sec. 1656 ACQ, at Page 687. 
"When facts are involved the appellate court 
is extremely reluctant to disagree with the trial 
court and the latter's findings are at all times 
given gTeat weight and deference, particularly 
\vhere the tr•iai judge saw and heard 'vitb \Yit-
nesses giving oral testimony. 
Ordinarily the findings will uot be disturbed if 
they are not clearly, plainly, palpably or mani-
festly wrong or erroneous. * * * * If examination 
discloses * * * * the findings are not wholly or 
totally wi tbout support in the evidence * * * * 
nor unreasonable, unsustainable on any reason-
able theory or hypothesis * * * * the appellate 
court \viii affirm.'' 
With this rule in mind, let us examine defendant 'R 
several points demonstrating· that there is no reversible 
error in the record of this case. 
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1. Did the trial eourt l~rr iu it~ ] 1indiug No. 1 ~? 
'fhe evideuee eleurly 8hO\r8 on September 29th plain-
tiffs \Yel't1 the ovv'ner of thirty-six head of steers (see 
Exhibit C), and the evidence sho\rs that they were on 
property enelo8Pd by the plaintiff LeRoy Shelby. (Tr. 
52). 
~. Did the trial eourt err in it~ E,iuding No. 2 ~~ 
The evidence as stated before (Tr. 52) indicates 
that on or about 10 :00 o'clock in the morning on Sep-
tember 29th, all of the steers belonging· to the plain-
tiffs ·w·ere on the plaintiff Shelby's property. 
3. Did the trial court err in its Finding No. 4 ~ 
Counsel professes ignorance of the word ''malici~ 
ously". The word is defined by Webster as, "Charae-
terized by or involving malice; having or done \vith or 
mischievous intentions or motives". 
The facts at bar indicate that defendant drove 
seventeen head of cattle a space of four to six miles in 
an hour in a direction directly away from the owner's 
premises. Defendant expressed his intent only to rid 
his premises of th animals, but the facts show he could 
have called or returned the cattle to the owners in a 
matter of minutes, and could have driven them off his 
premises in a short distance, but instead, he drove them 
over his land and in a direction opposite to the land 
of the plaintiff (Tr. 77 and 86) for an admitted three 
and one-half miles, well knowing that some would re-
turn to the Shelby property because a milk cow was 
among· them. (Tr. 86-88). 
'j 
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~,he facts as to the rest of the cattle iudicate that 
defendant's horse was with them at a distance of five 
miles to the east of the Shelby property. ( Tr. 47). 
Defendant maintains he only wanted to drive them 
off his property, but the evidence shows that his east 
ine is about one-half mile east of the Shelby property 
line, as is admitted by counsel at (Tr. 80). This would 
indicate he drove the cattle some four and one-half 
miles past his east line. 
Tl].ere is ample evidence that they were drive11 '~ 1 
a rapid pace. (Tr. 61-63). 
The evidence further shows all the cattle \Vere left 
in a rocky area \vhere there \Va.s insufficient feed and 
/or \Vater. (Tr. 47, Tr. 57-63). 
±. Did the trial court err in its :B..,inding· No. 3 t 
r~ehe defendant objects to that portion of the Find-
Ing as follows : 
''Defendant came upon the remaining seven-
teen head of steers upon a public road near a 
water hole kno\Vll ~s l\Iillie Spring.'' 
a11d also: 
'' * * and then and there wilfully and maliciously 
drove said seventeen head of steers from said 
water hole and for a distance of four to six 
miles and sea ttered the same among the breaks 
and brush and in a locality \Vhere there \vas then 
and there insufficient feed and water for their 
proper suhsiS'tence. '' 
The facts as to the Finding- of fact indicate that 
the first contention is erroneous in that the court found: 
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'· Defeudaut eHllll~ npou the rPillaiuiug· ~t~veu teeu 
head of s tel\rs at or upar a 'Yater hole knowu 
as :Jiillie Spring.'' 
With reference to defendant's other objection to 
Finding No. 5, it is believed that this is fully discussed 
in the facts set out relative to Finding No. 4. 
5. Did the trial eourt err in it~ Finding No. 61 
Defendant '8 net~ relati \·e to tl~e niueteen head 
ltaYe already been di8cussed iu Paragraph 3 above. 
However, as to the condition of all of the cattle, 
:::;ee Tr. 10. 
'• They looked pretty hard. They had a lot of 
roug-h treatment. They didn't look like the sam8 
cattle at all.'' 
Further the record is filled with evidence that the 
cattle suffered an average loss of ninety pounds. (Tr. 
3-11, Tr. 64-6, Tr. 45-63). 
6. Did the trial court err in its Finding No. 7 ~ 
The evidence is that there was no reason for the 
cattle to trespass on or stray from the Shelby property, 
for the reason that Shelby had (Tr. 50) gone to great 
lengths to improve the grass and forage on his property 
by planting brome grass and crested wheat g;rass. 
Further, there was water for said cattle on leased 
ground of plaintiff immediately south of his main pro-
perty. (See Exhibit "B", Plaintiff's land marked in 
red). 
7. Did the trial court err in its Finding No. 8 ~ 
The evidence shows without question that the cattle 
were sold on October 29th for 161/2 cents per pound, 
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and that but for the acts of the defendant, the cattl<~ 
would have been ninety pounds heavier on that date. 
No other evidence was needed. 
8. Did the trial court err in its l?iuding No. 9 and 
No. 10~ 
As appellant admits, there is ample evidence to fi11tl 
that the steers shrunk about ninety pounds apiece be-
t\veen September 29th and October 29th, ''Then the~­
vvere sold. Appellant raises a question as to ho\v much 
of the damage ·was caused by the running and ho\v 
much by the lack of food and \Vater. As will be seen 
by the law hereinafter cited, these questions raise pro-
blems that are immaterial and irrelevant. The fact is 
that due to the defendant's wrongful acts, these cattle 
lost weig·ht. How much of this loss is attributable to 
one wrongful act and how much to another is not a 
question of any merit.. The only question is whether 
defendant's acts resulted in the loss, and the answer 
to that is an unqualified ' 'yes' '. 
9. Defendant makes a contention of error in enter-
ing Conclusion of Law No. 1 and in entering Judge-
ment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant 
and in assessing the damag·es in the sum of Five Hund-
red Thirty-Four aud 60/100 ($534.60) Dollars. 
The ref ore let us 'examine the la ,,~ rela tiYe to the 
points now raised. 
LAW 
1. There seems to be a great deal of contention 
made by the defendant as to that part of Findings No. 
1 and No. 2 that indicate that the cattle had been en-
10 
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closed for a ~nb~tautial period of tin1e and \Vere re-
leased in au unfenced enclosure only the day that 
they \rere driven. 
There is a great deal of conflict in the evidence 
relative to this, and some eYidence to the effect that 
they had been out for a considerable period. 
It is submitted, lunreYer, that these findings are 
irnmnterial and irrele\'·aut to the cause of action before 
the Court, and \Vere put in the eomplaiut and the find-
ings probably by reason of counsel for plaintiffs In-
experience. 
The sole question in this matter· is whether or :not 
the defendant came upon steers owned by the plaintiffs 
on September 29, 1946, and wilfully and maliciously 
and to become lost. 
As regards to this question, whether they had 
been enclosed or in an enclosure for a period prior to 
the time of the acts complained of is irrelevant and not 
material to this case and further can have no injuriouH 
effect on the defendant's rights. 
The law on this subject is found at 5 C. J. S;, Sec-. 
tiun 1787, page 1192. 
''The mere taking of unnecessary and super-
fluous findings or the presence of error in find-
ing·s on immaterial, irreleva1~t, or purely collateral 
issues is harmless and uon-re,~ersible error if 
' the judgement iH otherwise sufficiently sup-
ported.'' 
''A judgement supported by proper finding~ i.~ 
uot vitiated- by finding-s on immaterial 1)oints or 
issue, for example, on issues outside the plead-
11 
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iuo·s or unsurJported by evidence or \\'here \\That-
b ~ ~ ' 
ever the findings on the issue it affords appel-
lant no cause of action or grounds of defense, 
but is without legal consequence; such findings 
may be treated as surplusag·e and discredited not 
only in that action, but als-o in subsequent liti-
gation.'' 
li'urther from 5 C. fl. S., fJecf:ion 1677, Page 810 aud 811, 
"The rule as to those errors ·which are in prin-
ciple collateral and without influence on the final 
result is that the record must not only estab-
lish the error but the party complaining with pre-
judice thereby; there must be an affirmatiYe 
showing that it was not unlikely that the error 
effected the result.'' 
"The doctrine of harmless error is favored and 
will be applied whenever it is reasonable and 
safe to do so.'' 
As has already been submitted, the errors, that de-
fendant now complains of, are collateral and do not in-
fluence the final result, or verdict, and further, it is to 
he noted that at no place in the brief of the defendant 
is there any affirmative showing that these errors, jf 
errors they be, adversely affected his rights. 
It is further submitted that this case \Vas tried be-
fore a judge who had been trained in the profession of 
law, and as a consequence, would give little o1· no heed 
to any irrelevant matter that might enter into the re-
cord, and that the defendant is not and was not pre-
judiced by these findings. 
The above law and argument might also be applied 
to defendant's seventh contention of error, namely, his 
objections to Findings No. 8. 
12 
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:2. l'he ht\\~ relati\'l\ to the principal i~sue presented 
by thi:::; ca8e seems to be uniform, although all the cases 
\rhich eouu~el has been able to find are relatively old 
cases. .J..\t 3 ('~. J. S., 4-Lnintals, Section 189, it is found: 
" .. \ laiH.lO\\·ner ha~ a right to drive trespassing 
animals from his lautl \Yhether it is or is not en·-
clo~ed, \vithout being liable for any injuries to 
~uch animals, if he u~e~ only ~uch ·nteans and jo1·ce 
a8 are cuHtnu:usura.te tvith a:nd ._..,·trictly lim~ited by 
fht: exi~:ti·ng uecesst:ty. Further, the r'ight to drive · 
off exists ollly to the extent necessary to prevent 
further injury to the la·udo~on.er, a·nd must be ex-
ercised Leith reaso~nable care to prevent unneces-
sary injuries to the trespassing animals.'' 
(Italics added) 
Again, at ~ 4-lntericau Jurisprudeuce, ..._4ni1nals, Sec-
t-ion 126, it is found : 
''A landowner has a right to exclude animals 
from his pre-mises but in doing so, he must ex-
ercises that degree of care to prevent injury 
that would ordinarily be observed by a pruduent 
person, and if harm results to them from failure 
to exercise such caution, he is liable for damages 
to the owner. He is likewise liable if he employs 
towards them any unnecessary violence. Mor-
over, as this right of the landowner to drive off 
the animals is based purely on the principle of 
preven.tation-, -it ceases as soon as they have 
crossed the litre 1narkin.g the limits of his terri-
tory. Thus, if a man drives cattle of another 
upun a highway in a direction to him known to 
be opposite to the owner's residence, and they 
are lost in consequence, he is liable for ronver-
sion, althoug·h he did not intend it.'' 
(Italics added) 
13 
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In Scott vs. (}ates, (North Carolina) 95 S. E. 551, 
the defendant shot certain bird dogs belonging to plain-
tiff, claiming· that they were chasing· a flock of turkey~ 
and it was necessary to shoot in order to prevent the tur-
keys from destruction. The Court holding· for the plain-
tiff, state the presence of the dogs on the premises of 
defendant gave him the right to drive them away but 
not to injure them unnecessarily, although they 'vere 
trespassing. The Court further stated that it was er-
roneous to charge a jury that the burden was on th~ 
plaintiff to satisfy the jury that the shooting· 'vas un-
lawful and wrongful, and held at the same time, that the 
burden should be on the defend~nt to prove a legal excuse 
for his acts to the satisfaction of the jury. In other 
words it is interpreted by the Supreme Court of N ortb 
Carolina that the acts are in the nature of an a firma-
tive defense \\Thich defendant must prove and justify, 
rather than an action for the plaintiff to prove. 
The reason is obvious that this must be so because 
such facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of only 
the defendant. Yet in the ease at bar, defendant's only 
evidence is that he drove the cattle in the ''ordinary 
manner" and he refused to explain what "ordinary 
manner'' meant. 
In the case of Richa-r-ds vs. Sauder son, (Colorado), 
89 Pac. 759, the defendant drove plaintiff's cattle, and 
the Court held to the effect that defendant would not 
be liable for damages in driving plaintiff's cattle off 
defendant's land if he did so without any unnecessary 
injury to the cattle, and held that in an action to re-
cover actual damages for wrongful driving of plain-
14 
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tiff's eattle, it is imn1at~rial \\'hether or uot before driv--
ing the c.attle, the defendant in good faith took legal 
advice and \vas governed thereby in what he did. 
In Thornpson vs. Sta.te, 16 .. Alabama 106, 42 Amer-
ica·n Reports 101, the defendant was charged with kill-
ing hogs of the plaintiff \vhile the hogs were in the act 
of eating, or destroying a gro\\ring crop of corn on the 
premise8 of the defendant. The Court held, 
'~ EYery person has a la\\rful right to defend hi~ 
personal property, not for the purpose of re-
dressing an injury already perpetrated, but pure-
ly upon the principle of preventa.tion in the pre-
sent and for the future. Yet this right, valuable 
and important as it is, must he commensurate 
with and strictly limited to the existing necessity.'' 
The Court found for the plaintiff and ordered that it 
did not make any difference how the hogs got on the 
defendant's land, whether by breaking through the fence, 
or by a gate that had been left open. 
In the case at bar, it would seem that there is ample 
proof that defendant's handling of the cattle was not 
as an ordinary and prudent man would have done, but 
rather, that they were handled by a man who was. very 
irate, angry, and determined to inflict some injury up-
on the plaintiff. 
Counsel apparently gets a great deal of comfort 
out of a statement in Corpus ~Turis Secundum as follows: 
''Ordinarily if the land owner lawfully drives 
trespassing· animals -off of his premises he is 
not liable because he drives them in a direction 
opposite to that of their owner's premises, and 
if the animals enter from the highway on remote 
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premises the land owner may return them to the 
highway on unenclosed lands and will not be li-
able for any injury threafter suffered by them, 
expeeially where the injury is the result of the 
owner's negligence in failing to care for them 
after notice of their situation.'' 
An examination of the above statement indicates 
that the only authority for such statement is the case 
of Humphrey vs. Douglass, 11 Vt. 22, 34 A1nerican De-
cisions 668. For a proper examination of the facts ~n 
this case, it must be understood that this case was .'-t 
rehearing of the ease of Humphrey vs. Douglass, 10 Vt. 
71, 33 American Decisions 177. The facts in this cas(~ 
indicate that two horses broke through an adjoining fence 
onto the property of the defendant, and that upon dis-
eovering them, he took them out to the road and turned 
them loose. There is nothing in the evidence to in-
dicate that_ he turned them in an opposite direction to 
plaintiff's land. It would seem, therefore, that the 
decision quoted does not sustain the contention of the 
author of the Corpus Juris Secundum article. 
It is further interesting to note that the case u~ed 
as authority for the above decisions is that of Richardso~z 
vs. Carr, 25 American Decisions 56, 1 Ha.rrington 142 
(Delaw~are) wherein the Court says: 
'''If a cow be found trespassing on anther's prc-
erty, the owner of the property may impound 
her or sue for damages or drive her out; but i!1 
driving her out, he must use only necessary vio-
lence or he becomes himself a trespasser and li-
able in damages to the owner of the cow. If the 
defendant in this ease beat the plaintiff's cow 
and mangled her 'vith dogs, as he is charged, he 
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is a trespabtit\r, though the CO\\' was in his corn-
field; and the pla.intiff ought to have damages 
to the value of the CO\\' if her death was occasioned 
by his act. '' 
It would seem that the only actual case that goes to 
the direction in 'vhich cattle or stock may be driven 
"·hen being removed from one's premises is the case of 
Tob-in cs. Deal, (Wi~co·usi-n) 18 "f-l. ll'". 634, ''"'herein it was 
held that if a man drives the cattle of another upon a 
bigh,vay in a direction known to him to be opposite to 
the owner's residence, and they are lost in consequence, 
he is liable for conversion, although hedid not intend it. 
It would seem, therefore, that there is no case 
authority for counsel's contention that the defendant 
bad the right to drive the oattle in any way or in any 
direction that he chose. · 
It . would seem, therefore, that upon examination 
of all the law available, the acts of driving animals off 
one's property must be done under the guidance of two 
requisites imposed- by law, (1) the driver must only 
use such means and force as are necessary to drive the 
animals off his property, and that he is liable in dam-
ages for any· unnecessary violence occasioned by such 
act, and(2) that the act of driving must be based purely 
upon the principle of prevention of present injury to 
his property. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs do not admit that there is any tres-
pass in this case, but submit the evidence as to the seven-
teen head of cattle indicates that they were driven dowu 
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'vhat had been desig~1ated as a road and used for the 
purpose of going to and from water, and that it wa~ 
recog11ized as a road. 
It is further submitted that the remaining nine-
teen head were taken by the defendant from the land 
of the plaintiff, and that his acts relative to both band~ 
of cattle were entirely repehensible and without right. 
It is submitted, however, that even if it be found 
that the cattle were trespassing upon land of the defend-
ant, his acts did not adhere to the law hereinbefore 
set forth. 
Defendant endeavors to break his 'vrongful acts 
into two parts as regards damages and he seems to hold 
that even if he be found quilty of wrongfully driving 
plaintiffs' cattle, he is only liable for the loss engendered 
as a result of the running and is not liable for the im-
mediate consequences of this act. 
This would seem to be directly contrary to the la ". 
of the Tobin case supra and the other authorities cited. 
It is also inconceivable as a matter of sheer logic that 
it can be maintained that a man may be held responsible 
for the actual doing of a deed but not responsible for 
the direct result of the deed. Surely the appellant 
would not contend that had he run the cattle over a cliff, 
he would be responsible only for the damages sustained 
to the animals while they were running to the brink of 
the cliff, and the appellant would be free of the dam-
ages sustained to the cattle as a result of their fall. 
It would seem, threfore, relatively obvious that th0 
appellant did not drive the cattle (1) off his premise3 
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in the manner that a rua~onable aud prudent man woulu 
do, (2) \Yith an effort to minimize his damages, but that 
in fact the appellant \Yas motiYated solely with a desire 
to inflict damages and harm upon the plaintiffs, and 
as a direct and proximate result of his wrongful acts, 
these cattle \vere damaged, as the Court found, in an 
average loss of \Yeight of ninety _pounds per animal. 
It is ~ubmitted that the judgement of the District 
Court i.s supported not only by ample competent evi-
dence, but by the la,Y, and it is requested that this appeal 
be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
c:Iyde Patterson 
Attorney fo~r Respondents 
aJt-d Plaintiffs 
.. 
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